do the daily changes matter? by Tange, Jeroen
  
 
 
CSR and stock market reaction – Do the daily 
changes matter? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Master thesis 
 
 
 
Jeroen Tange 
 
 
 
Paulo Rodrigues 
Rafael Zambrana 
Maastricht University school of business and economics (i6070777) 
NOVA University school of business and economics (32346) 
 
I 
 
Abstract 
The aim of this paper is to examine whether investors react towards daily corporate decisions 
with regards to environmental, social and governance practices. Unlike other literature 
published in the field of corporate social responsibility, this paper tracks, based on a unique 
database, daily corporate ESG decisions. By making use of event study methodology this paper 
gives a glance at the stock market reaction based on abnormal returns. Results show that 
investors react asymmetrical towards ESG related news. There is no distinct reaction towards 
positive news, while there is a significant negative reaction towards negative ESG news. 
Furthermore, there appears to be no significant distinction between the reaction towards 
companies perceived as socially responsible and companies perceived as socially irresponsible. 
To conclude, the study results show that corporate social performance and financial 
performance are not one-to-one related and only a clear negative reaction towards negative ESG 
events emerges.     
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1. Introduction 
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), defined by the European Commission as, “a concept 
whereby companies integrate social and environmental concerns in their business operations 
and in their interaction with their stakeholders on a voluntary basis” (2001). CSR is based on 
three main categories, environmental, social and corporate governance (ESG). The 
environmental category focusses on the relation between the company’s business and its impact 
on nature. The social category focusses on the relationship between the firm and stakeholders, 
such as employees and communities. The third category, governance, is mainly focused on the 
shareholders and tries to prevent any conflicts of interest or other agency related problems.  
 
There is an increased focus on sustainable and responsible investments; individual as well as 
corporate investors have increased their demand for corporate social investments. An important 
factor is to incorporate environmental, social and corporate governance (ESG) criteria into 
portfolio construction and asset management. This is done by assessing qualitative as well as 
quantitative data of ESG performance, practices, policies and impacts. Out of the $40.3 trillion 
total assets under professional management in the US, $8.1 trillion is invested based on ESG 
incorporation in 2016, indicating that one out of every five dollars is allocated according to 
ESG criteria. The number of funds that incorporate ESG criteria has grown by 12 percent over 
the years 2014-2016 (USSIF foundation, 2016). In Europe, $2.88 trillion is allocated to ESG 
integration, indicating a 39 percent growth over the 2014-2016 period (Global Sustainable 
Investment Review, 2016). Also, in Japan, Australia/New Zealand and Canada, corporate social 
responsible investment has risen over the last couple of years, indicating the global importance 
of responsible investment strategies.  
 
Whether the incorporation of ESG-criteria into portfolio management can lead to higher returns, 
however, remains questionable. On the one hand, according to Friedman (1962), the company’s 
main purpose is to make money, and not to act based on moral believes. From this neoclassical 
point of view, a company should not spend money on ESG related issues, because the money 
spend on moral initiatives is lost for the current shareholders. As a result of these ESG 
expenditures the company increases its costs which leads to a competitive disadvantage as the 
firm is unable to compete with its less honorable competitors. The argumentation of Friedman 
is purely based on a financial standpoint and he therefore claims that investing money in ESG 
concerns is counterproductive. On the other hand, some believe that there is a positive link 
between socially responsible behavior and firm value. They also agree with Friedman that the 
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money spend on ESG initiatives is not paid out to shareholders immediately. However, they 
argue that the investments lead to higher profitability in the long-term and hence improve 
shareholder value. This shareholder value comes from additional reputational advantages, 
avoidance of future social problems and the ability to better coincide with tighter environmental 
regulations. So, overall, these ESG investments are a way to minimize future risk and construct 
better customer and investor relations.  
 
Which theory dominates is still not completely clear and so far there has only been a focus on 
the connection between major ESG-events and financial performance. Previous literature took 
a closer look at the relationship during industrial accidents, product tampering, oil spills, air 
crashes, corporate fraud etc. And the results of these papers generally come down to the 
conclusion that severe negative social behavior leads to a negative reaction in the stock market 
and might even go beyond the direct costs associated with the negative event itself. However, 
less attention goes to the smaller day-to-day social decisions that companies make and how this 
may impact firm value and under what circumstances. By the usage of a unique dataset, this 
paper tries to give more insight towards the market reaction after daily corporate decisions.  
 
To analyze the daily effects of ESG, the remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Firstly, 
the paper will present the relevant literature in the field of ESG and event studies. Secondly, 
based on the literature several hypotheses are developed. Thirdly, the dataset and its 
composition are addressed and the event study that is used is further explained in the 
methodology. Fourthly, the empirical results of the event study are presented. Fifthly, several 
results are presented based on an alteration of the underlying assumptions. Sixthly, the results 
of the event study are discussed alongside the limitations. Seventhly, some suggestions for 
further research are presented. Lastly, the paper will summarize and conclude the main findings 
and contributions of the study. 
 
2. Literature review 
This part of the paper summarizes the literature addressing event studies as well as corporate 
social responsibility. 
 
2.1 Event studies 
Kothari and Warner (2004) show that event studies are useful to measure the impact and 
magnitude of an (unanticipated) change in the wealth of the firms’ stockholders at the time of 
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an event. Event studies can also be used to test for market efficiency, indicating that a nonzero 
abnormal return persisting after the event is inconsistent with market efficiency theorem. The 
use of event study methodology is widely applied in academic literature to analyze all sorts of 
events; mergers and acquisitions (Shah and Arora, 2014), stock splits (Griffin, 2010) and 
earnings announcements (Thathaiah and Dsouza, 2014), among many more. The usage of event 
studies is also highly applicable to examine topics related to corporate social responsibility; 
pollution (Hamilton, 1993), environmental corporate social responsibility (Flammer, 2013), or 
changes in environmental and social indexes (Curran and Moran, 2007). This paper will apply 
event study methodology to analyze whether a significant change in an aggregated ESG score 
leads to a visible reaction in the stock market. In order to test for an impact on the wealth of the 
firms’ claimholders, the return of a company is divided into an anticipated return and an 
abnormal return. The normal return is estimated by the market return model explained by 
McKinlay (1997), while the abnormal return is the residual value of the actual return and the 
expected normal return. If there is a realized abnormal return during the event date it indicates 
that this is beyond what the market was expecting and hence it can be apportioned to the change 
in ESG-score. 
 
The argumentation connecting ESG to abnormal returns comes from Falemi and Fooladi (2013) 
who argue that companies taking social and environmental costs of doing business into account 
during their decision-making process will experience positive shifts in their demand. To the 
contrary, businesses that do not take these costs into account will experience negative demand 
shocks. So, as soon as companies take actions that comply with sustainability, their ESG score 
will show a shift up, while companies making decisions against environmental and social 
practices will experience a shift down. These shifts in score can affect the abnormal return of a 
company based on two arguments. The first argument is economical, there are costs and benefits 
associated with ESG expenditures that can affect the firm value in different ways. Firstly, if the 
benefits outweigh the cost there will be a positive stock market reaction. Secondly, if the costs 
outweigh the benefits there will be a negative stock market reaction. Thirdly, if the costs and 
benefits are equal there will be a neutral stock market reaction. The second argument is 
discriminatory, investors also derive some non-financial utility from ESG investing and hence 
a shift in the score might increase or decrease demand beyond market expectation, which could 
lead to positive (increase in the score) or negative (decrease in the score) abnormal returns 
during the event (Mǎnescu, 2011).  
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2.2 Detailed ESG impact 
This part of the paper will look at the components that all individually affect corporate social 
responsibility. It addresses how environmental, social and governance decisions affect firm 
value based on prior literature.  
 
2.2.1 Environmental impact 
The first component is environmental and economic theory suggests that higher environmental 
costs increase production prices and hence have a negative effect on the profitability of the firm. 
There are several academic papers that use an event study to analyze this relationship. First, 
Hamilton (1995) incorporates news related to the use of toxic chemicals and shows that 
companies face a severe negative stock price reaction after being associated with higher usage 
of toxic chemicals. An increased level of poisonous chemicals leads to higher costs through 
enlarged pollution emissions, liabilities from pollution cases, but also due to a loss of reputation 
and goodwill. The article shows that on the day of the information release, companies 
experience a severely negative, significant abnormal return. Moreover, in the long-run (5 days 
after the information became public) the companies still experience a statistically significant 
negative abnormal return.   
 
The second paper using event study methodology is Flammer (2013), who shows that after a 
positive environmental announcement companies experience a significant stock price increase, 
while after a negative announcement they face a significant negative stock price reaction. The 
article also shows that the magnitude of the return for eco-friendly behavior has reduced over 
the years while the punishment for eco-harmful behavior has increased. This indicates a signal 
of increased external pressure towards CSR. Furthermore, companies scoring higher on 
environmental CSR show a smaller positive (negative) stock market reaction on eco-friendly (-
harmful) events. 
 
The third paper that connects ESG and stock market reactions using the event study is from 
Klassen and McLaughlin (1996). They show that stock prices rise after the achievement of 
environmental rewards and fall after environmental crises, which is in line with the results of 
Flammer (2013). However, the impact of these awards is highly dependent on the industry in 
which the company operates. For example, they found a smaller increased positive reaction for 
firms in environmentally dirty industries. Indicating that the magnitude of the reaction depends 
on the industry in which a firm operates. 
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The relationship between stock returns and environmental scores is also examined by Derwall 
et al. (2004) using portfolio theory. They created an eco-efficiency score that measures the 
economic value a firm creates relative to the waste it generates. The paper shows that a portfolio 
consisting of company stocks in the high-ranked eco-efficiency score outperforms its low-
ranked counterpart after adjusting the returns for market risk, investment style, and industry 
effects. 
 
All four of the papers therefore find a positive relationship between being environmentally bad 
and doing financially bad; and three of the four papers find a positive relationship between 
being environmentally good and financially good.  
 
2.2.2 Social impact 
The second component is social in which the relationship between being financially good and 
socially good is less clear. Hillman and Keim (2001) show this by splitting social responsibility 
into two dimensions: stakeholder management and social issue participation. They argue, on 
the one side, that investments regarding primary stakeholders may improve financial returns by 
helping firms develop valuable intangible assets, which in turn leads to a competitive 
advantage. On the other hand, participating in social issues that are not directly related to the 
primary stakeholders of the firm might not create similar results. The paper supports this 
argument and finds a positive impact on shareholder value with regard to stakeholder 
management, but a negative impact with regard to social issue participation.  
 
The study of Edmans et al. (2014) focusses on one group of primary stakeholders explicitly and 
shows that superior performance is associated with higher employee satisfaction under certain 
labor market flexibility. Investing in primary stakeholders can attract high-quality workers to a 
firm and ensure that they remain loyal to the firm, which in turn leads to a sustainable 
competitive advantage. This is especially the case for knowledge-based industries such as 
pharmaceuticals, software and financial services. The authors use a list of the “100 best 
companies to work for in America”, and show that they outperform their peers by 2-3% per 
year. These kind of “best lists” are also used to test the effect for other countries to support their 
initial results. The findings are interesting, showing that the investment in social responsibility 
is only leading to excess returns in countries with high labor market flexibility, but not so in 
countries with low labor market flexibility. 
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Orlitzky et al. (2003) also analyze the same primary stakeholder group and find that there is 
another factor correlating with employee satisfaction and outperformance. They show that 
social responsibility is correlated not only with future firm performance but also with past 
financial performance. Indicating that firms having a higher capital availability are better able 
to invest it in their own employees leading to better stakeholder management and eventually to 
outperformance.  
 
The paper of Brammer and Millington (2008) focusses on the other group defined by Hillman 
and Keim (2001) and they find contrary results. The paper examines whether corporate 
philanthropic donations enhance firm value in the short- and long-run. For the short-run, 
community and philanthropic programs involve a significant initial investment both financially 
and non-financially, whereas the benefits are mainly reached in the long-term. The reason for 
this long-term effect is that the initial costs take some time to be amortized, but also because 
external stakeholders need to gain awareness of the firm’s social responsibility. As a result, 
short-run outperformance is mainly reached by companies that are classified as low donation 
companies (a 1-year horizon). While long-run outperformance is accomplished by the high 
classification companies (a 5-to 10-year horizon). The striking part is that, although the higher 
investment companies outperform the middle and lower tier companies, the lower tier 
companies also show financial outperformance regarding the middle group. Indicating that 
unusually high investments in social responsibility lead to financial outperformance but saving 
the cost of donations and invest it somewhere else can also be a competitive advantage.  
 
To conclude, the visibly positive relationship observed for environmental concerns does not 
exist for social concerns or is at least less obvious. Social concerns are first split into subgroups 
and even then, the results are not conclusive. It is therefore unclear whether being socially good 
also leads to being financially good. 
 
2.2.3 Corporate governance impact  
The third component is corporate governance which relates to the agent (manager)-principal 
(investor) problem. This conflict of interest is mitigated by separation of ownership and control 
and can involve large agency costs to shareholders. Managers and directors may behave in a 
way that insufficiently enhances shareholders’ value, or they enjoy building corporate empires 
and extract private benefits of control, but also by entrenching themselves by anti-takeover 
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provisions like poison pills to prevent shareholders to exercise control. According to La Porta 
et al. (1999), investor protection is an important determinant of firm value. When shareholder 
and creditor rights are better protected by law, investors are willing to pay more for financial 
assets. Due to better protection shareholders realize more of the firm’s profits come back to 
them instead of disappearing into manager’s pocket. The results of their research show that 
countries with higher shareholder protectionism have a higher corporate valuation as opposed 
to countries with lower protection rights.  
 
The paper of Gompers et al. (2003) builds on this argumentation and examines the relation 
between a set of 24-corporate-governance provisions and the firm’s long-run performance. 
Based on an overall governance score an investment strategy is implemented in which the firms 
with the highest scores are bought and firms with the lowest scores are sold. This strategy results 
in an abnormal 8.5% return per year. Also, Tobin’s Q shows that firm value is highly associated 
with the governance index, as a lower corporate governance rating is associated with a lower 
Tobin’s Q. 
 
Results of Cremers and Nair (2005) who investigate the effect of both internal and external 
control on equity prices conclude the same as La Porta et al. (1999) and Gompers et al. (2003). 
The authors show that internal and external governance mechanisms work as complements in 
being associated with long-term abnormal returns. An investment strategy that shorts firms with 
low takeover vulnerability and high public pension fund ownership and buys firms with high 
takeover vulnerability and high public pension fund ownership is able to generate an alpha of 
10%-15%. They also find that external and internal governance mechanisms are associated with 
accounting measures of profitability. Bauer et al. (2004) apply the same method to the European 
market and find that a strong corporate governance rating is associated with a higher stock 
return, but they find a negative relationship regarding accounting measures. 
 
Dimson et al. (2012) approach corporate governance a bit different, they examine whether 
active ownership improves financial performance. Based on an extensive database provided by 
a large financial institution, they find that active ownership with regards to ESG concerns lead 
to abnormal returns in the next year. Especially the reaction concerning governance and climate 
change appears to yield a strong market reaction. According to the paper, CSR activism 
attenuates managerial bias and hence helps to minimize intertemporal losses of profit and 
negative externalities.  
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In conclusion, the reaction of improved corporate governance is positive. Indicating that 
companies being good with regards to governance are also financially better. Unlike the social 
aspects, there appears to be, just as with the environmental concerns, a clear positive relation. 
 
2.3 Overall ESG impact 
After the assessment of the individual components this part of the paper combines all of them 
and assesses the overall effect of ESG on firm value. 
 
2.3.1 ESG is value enhancing 
The fact that ESG practices enhance shareholder value through firms and society is shown by 
Porter and Kramer (2006). They mention that sustainable development and value creation is 
generated by meeting the needs of the present without harming the needs of future generations. 
Therefore, value creation should be considered as the joint benefit of the firm and the 
surrounding community.  This long versus short-term view is shared with Fatemi and Fooladi 
(2013) who criticize the efficient market hypothesis, that the current price is the best reflection 
of the true value of the company. They instead suggest a sustainable value creation model that 
takes both social and environmental responsibilities into account by determining a firm value. 
Due to increasing concerns about population growth, climate change, water issues, 
consumption problems and environmental problems the firms who do not engage in long-term 
sustainability will become the stragglers of their sector, gradually harming their own firm value. 
The authors argue that firms might be able to ignore ESG concerns in the short-run but will 
face the consequences of this in the long-run and hence firm value should reflect this risk.  
 
Another widely examined way in which ESG expenditure benefits firm value is through a 
reduction of the cost of capital. The first component is the cost of equity which appears to be 
significantly lower for firms with higher environmental expenditures. A paper by Ghoul, 
Guedhami, et al. (2016) shows that higher ESG expenditure leads to a lower cost of equity and 
in turn to a higher firm value. A paper written by Dhaliwal et al. (2011) find a similar 
relationship between the cost of capital and the initiation of corporate social responsibility 
reporting. The paper shows four important factors that determine the decision to voluntarily 
disclose CSR reports to the public. Firstly, firms facing a high cost of equity capital are more 
likely to initiate standalone CSR disclosures. Secondly, companies initiating voluntary 
disclosure decreases the cost of equity capital if they also have a high CSR rating. Thirdly, firms 
- 10 - 
 
having a high CSR rating attract more analyst coverage and more dedicated institutional 
investors. Lastly, firms voluntarily disclosing CSR information are more likely to engage in 
seasoned equity offerings in the two years following the initiations. In line with Dhaliwal, 
Reverte (2012), who investigated the same phenomenon in the Spanish market, found that 
disclosing CSR leads to a reduction in the cost of equity especially for firms operating in 
environmentally sensitive industries. The second component is the cost of debt which also 
appears to be lower for firms with high ESG expenditure. According to Goss and Roberts 
(2011), firms that face higher CSR concerns are subject to slightly higher spreads and hence a 
more expensive cost of debt. This effect, however, is only present until a certain ESG level. 
From that they conclude that there is no marginal benefit by increasing ESG expenditures even 
further and that banks realize this and punish those firms by increasing the spread again. 
  
Also, non-financial rewards are associated with ESG expenditure. Bollen (2007) incorporates 
the non-financial reward of socially responsible investors in a multi-attribute utility function. 
This function takes the extra utility gain from owning securities of companies that are consistent 
with personal values into account. To capture this non-financial utility, the author examines the 
volatility of investor cash flows into socially responsible mutual funds and conventional mutual 
funds. Results show that during lagged negative return periods socially responsible mutual 
funds face less capital outflow as conventional mutual funds, indicating that investors derive 
some utility from the social responsible attribute of their investment and are therefore less likely 
to shift capital away from poorly performing SR funds. This finding is also consistent with 
Gezcy et al. (2003), who showed that there is less capital withdrawal from socially responsible 
mutual funds than from conventional mutual funds during the 1999-2001 period, indicating 
higher loyalty among socially responsible investors.  
 
The overall firm value therefore increases with ESG due to better risk protection of future 
concerns, lower cost of capital and higher customer loyalty. 
 
2.3.2 ESG is value destructive 
Not everyone agrees that ESG practices are necessarily value enhancing, according to Barnea 
and Rubin (2010), who conducted research on corporate social responsible (CSR) among 3000 
US corporations, CSR expenditure can lead to a principal-agent problem. This problem arises 
when managers overinvest in CSR with the reason to improve their own reputation as a 
responsible manager. The authors reason from an assumption of monotonic and concave CSR 
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expenditure, when CSR expenditure is low, improvements in CSR lead to a positive effect on 
firm value. However, at some point an additional dollar increase in CSR expenditure must 
decrease shareholder wealth as there is no transfer of wealth to its shareholders possible 
anymore. So, when managers overinvest in CSR for personal benefits, the increased CSR rating 
will not lead to an increase in firm value, but rather to a destruction of firm value. These 
problems seem more prominent with low insider ownership and low levels of debt, indicating 
that over-investment in CSR occurs if the insiders bear a small fraction of the cost of doing so. 
The paper of Schaltegger and Burrit (2010) also addresses this spectre of ‘greenwashing’, in 
which firms improve social performance purely for presentational reasons and in which they 
do not try to improve the underlying sustainability.  
 
Alongside the risk of knowingly spending on wasteful CSR, there is the risk of unknowingly 
spending on wasteful CSR.  The paper of Khan et al. (2015) tries to capture this phenomenon 
by examining the impact of material versus immaterial sustainability separately. This to exclude 
the expenditure of intentional or unintentional wasteful CSR, and to better examine the 
difference in impact of CSR between industries and firms. Their results show that firms having 
a high material sustainability rating outperform firms with a poor rating, however, firms scoring 
high on immaterial CSR expenditure do not outperform firms with a poor rating. The paper 
finds that material CSR investments lead to estimated alphas of 4.83% while the immaterial 
issues lead to a negative alpha of 0.38%.  
 
Another concern that arises with ESG policies is the fact that a written document saying that 
the firm invests in ESG is not a reliable indicator for the firm’s commitment to, or the 
performance on sustainable long-term commitments. Cappucci (2018), finds an interesting 
paradox in which only a small group of exceptional firms is capable of generating excess returns 
based on ESG factors. However, only a small group of investment managers adopts the strategy 
of only investing in this select group of firms and instead invest in all the ESG firms. In the 
case of investing in all the firms instead of the smaller group the costs that are associated with 
ESG outweigh the promised benefits. Also, Geczy et al. (2005), show that the cost of using 
ESG restrictions outweigh the benefits. The authors demonstrate this by using a simple 
screening technique. In their investment strategy they rule out irresponsible mutual funds and 
it appears that the returns of the portfolio without these firms is lower than the returns generated 
by the portfolio in which this SRI constraint is not present. An important reason for the lower 
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return is that by investing only in a smaller portion of available mutual funds, you lose part of 
the diversification benefit and hence you are more subject to firm-specific risk. 
 
Overall, the results of these papers show that improving CSR might bear higher costs than the 
gained benefits. This is due to a loss of diversification benefits, greenwashing practices, or 
being unable to detect whether the CSR is material for the firm. 
 
3. Hypotheses development 
In this part of the paper, I construct several hypotheses for the empirical analysis in this paper. 
Due to the differences in results concerning SRI and firm value the first hypotheses will 
examine whether the overall ESG-rating is firm value enhancing, firm value destructing or firm 
value neutral. The appearance of positive links will emerge, for instance, when firms are better 
able to maintain and satisfy the workforce (Edmans et al., 2014), or due to a reduction in the 
cost of capital (Guedhami et al., [2016], Goss and Roberts, [2011]). A negative link emerges 
when ESG expenditure is done based on “greenwashing” (Barnea and Rubin, [2010], 
Schaltegger and Burrit, [2010]), or when the resources spend on CSR have an immaterial impact 
on the firm (Khan et al., 2015). No overall effect will occur when the positive and negative 
effects cancel each other out, or because the improvement (worsening) of ESG does not affect 
revenues and hence there is no stock market reaction. The first hypothesis is therefore 
formulated as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 1(0): The change in ESG-rating does not lead to a significant abnormal 
return during the event. 
Hypothesis 1(A): The change in ESG-rating does lead to a significant abnormal return 
during the event.  
 
Building on the hypothesis result before, we assess the direction of the abnormal return. 
Previous literature on behavioral finance shows that there is an asymmetrical reaction between 
positive and negative economic information (Schepers, 2006). These findings are also prevalent 
in sustainable finance. Klassen and McLaughlin (1996), show that the punishment for negative 
environmental crises is higher than the benefits for positive environmental rewards. Also, 
Krüger (2014), finds that investors react strongly negatively to negative events and weakly 
negatively to positive events. The following hypothesis is developed to addresses this 
asymmetrical behavior: 
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Hypothesis 2(0): Investors react similarly to bad ESG news as compared to good ESG 
news. 
Hypothesis 2(A): Investors have a stronger reaction towards negative ESG news 
compared to good ESG news. 
 
The next hypothesis is based on the reasoning of monotonic and concave CSR, which indicates 
that an increase in Score when the CSR level is high is less impactful than when the Score is 
low (Barnea and Rubin, 2010). Bird et al. (2007), also shows that within the environmental 
area, the market expects companies to reach a certain minimum environmental standard but 
punishes the companies that voluntarily go beyond this level. Therefore, indicating that there is 
no marginal benefit for shareholders after increasing standards when a certain score is already 
reached. This is further in line with Flammer (2013), who shows that shareholders of companies 
with stronger environmental performance and fewer environmental concerns, respectively, 
react less positively to eco-friendly events and less negatively to eco-harmful events compared 
to companies with lower environmental performance. 
 
Hypothesis 3(0): Companies with a higher ESG-score react similar to events as 
companies with a lower ESG-score. 
Hypothesis 3(A): Companies with a higher ESG-score react less to events than 
companies with a lower ESG-score. 
 
4. Data and methodology 
This part of the paper explains in further detail the dataset and the corresponding methodology 
used to test my hypotheses. 
 
4.1 Dataset 
The dataset is provided by TruValue Labs and contains daily ESG scores. The score integrates 
the Sustainability Accounting Standards Board’s (SASB’s) materiality standards and uses a 
company’s long-term ESG track record, which is less sensitive to daily events and reflects the 
enduring performance record over time, in order to obtain an overall company score on ESG.  
The data focuses on company ESG behavior from external sources and includes both positive 
and negative events. It uses 75,000 data sources and extracts, aggregates, generates and analyses 
this data real life. The score is then aggregated by combing four different factors. First, the 
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insight score, which tracks a company’s long-term ESG track record. Second, the pulse score, 
which measure the near-term performance changes that highlights opportunities and 
controversies. Third, the momentum score, measures a company’s ESG behavior trend over 
time. Fourth, the volume score, measures the information flow or number of articles about a 
company including different news channels, NGOs, trade blogs, industry publications and 
social media. These four scores form the first component of a company’s overall score. The 
second component consists of the aggregate score of the categories in table 1. The final 
component is an industry percentile score which provides the company’s materiality insight 
ranking within the SASB SICS industry to which the company has been allocated.  
 
The construction of this data has several major advantages compared to traditional ESG score 
databases. Firstly, this data is not dependent on published company materials and does not 
depend heavily on disclosure levels like certain other measures. Secondly, the data is gathered 
at the current moment and is therefore not subject to time-lagging.  
 
Table 1 
ESG-Score composition 
This table presents the overall ESG composition and shows which specific categories are included in the different pillars. Data is collected from 
TruValue Labs. 
Pillar Specific category 
Leadership and governance • Systematic risk management 
• Accident and safety management 
• Business ethics and transparency of 
payments 
• Competitive behavior 
• Regulatory capture and political 
influence 
• Materials sourcing 
• Supply chain management 
 
Environment 
 
• Lifecycle impacts of products and 
services 
• Environmental and social impacts on 
assets and operations 
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• Product packaging 
• Product quality and safety 
 
Business model and innovation 
 
• Lifecycle impacts of products and 
services 
• Environmental and social impacts on 
assets and operations 
• Product packaging 
• Product quality and safety 
 
Social capital 
 
• Human rights and community 
relations 
• Access and affordability 
• Customer welfare 
• Data security and customer privacy 
• Fair disclosure and labeling 
• Fair marketing and advertising 
 
Human capital 
 
• Labor relations 
• Fair labor practices 
• Diversity and inclusion 
• Compensation and benefits 
• Recruitment, development and 
retention 
 
In total the database contains 573 companies with each 1,446 trading days. Each company 
receives two scores, “Score1” and “Score2”, measuring an overall score and an overall score 
adjusted for investors specifically. Only companies having both scores and a return on a given 
trading day are included in the initial sample, leaving 657,264 observations in total. From these 
657,264 observations divided over the 573 companies and 1,446 trading days I calculated the 
daily percentage change in Score1 and Score2. Significant changes are considered based on the 
company’s standard deviation in Score percentage change, an event is considered when the 
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daily change is more than three standard deviations away from the mean change of the Score. 
This approach is used for both Score1 and Score2.  
 
To filter the data, I excluded companies that miss data during the 195-day estimation period 
and exclude events when they occur during the estimation period of another event to stay clear 
of clustering effects. After the filters are applied there are 337 positive events and 949 negative 
events totaling 1,286 events divided over the two scores of the 573 companies and 1,446 trading 
days.  
 
4.2 Methodology 
Compared to previous research conducted on firm value and ESG this new database introduces 
the possibility of real time tracking and can therefore better capture the immediate stock market 
reaction on the new information available. To test the hypotheses developed in the third section 
this paper makes use of event study methodology. 
 
There are, however, some short-comings of event studies. Using event studies requires me to 
set an event date (t=0), as the date on which a significant change of a company’s value occurs. 
There are two drawbacks to this approach. First, the determination of a “significant change” 
might be considered arbitrary. Second, it might be that the actual event happened the day before 
it became public. This is, however, compared to previous literature conducted in this area 
(Flammer [2013], Hamilton [1993]) to less severe concern as the program uses machine 
learning to capture the immediate effect and is therefore less subject to delays of traditional 
newspapers or reports. However, a concern that remains even with the use of machine learning 
is the problem of insider trading. Therefore, the main event window is extended to [-1,0], to 
capture some of the insider trading effect (if it occurs). Additionally, it might take the market 
some time to fully process all the new information or it might happen that the news becomes 
public after the closing of the market and hence the market will only react on the following day. 
This justifies the decision to also include the day after the event, leading to a main event window 
of [-1,1].  
 
Shortcomings, besides setting the appropriate event window and the risk of insider trading, 
influencing the results is that the market may over- or underestimate the impact of any event on 
financial performance, which leads to wrongly discounting future cash flows.  The last problem 
that is associated with event studies is the fact that another unanticipated event could occur at 
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the same time and is actually responsible for the abnormal return, leading to incorrectly 
allocating the abnormal return to a shift in ESG score. In order to minimize these shortcomings, 
the actual event window surrounding the significant change is kept very short.    
 
Figure 1: Timeline of an event study 
 
 
Stock market event studies are premised on the assumption that the stock market operates 
efficiently and that therefore all information and expectations are included in the current price. 
All future cash flows that are associated with an event are discounted by the market, based on 
net present value as soon as the event becomes public. In general, event studies are used to 
examine the relationship between a firm’s return and the market return over a time prior to the 
event of interest. If new information becomes available about a firm, the company’s stock might 
rise or fall depending on the nature of this new information. The prediction error for a firm, the 
difference between the normal return predicted by the market model for the company and the 
company’s actual return on a given day, is used as a measure of the abnormal returns attributed 
to the release of the new information about the company (Hamilton, 1993). The market model 
assumes that there is a stable linear relation between the market return and the security return. 
For firm i and event date τ the abnormal return is: 
 
𝐴𝑅𝑖𝜏 =  𝑅𝑖𝜏 − 𝐸(𝑅𝑖𝜏|𝑋𝜏) 
 
Where 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝜏, 𝑅𝑖𝜏 and 𝐸(𝑅𝑖𝜏|𝑋𝜏) are the abnormal, actual, and normal returns respectively for 
time period τ. 𝑋𝜏 is the conditioning information for the normal return model. This model will 
test whether the additional data on ESG provides news to investors, this will be the case if 
significant abnormal returns are observed. There are several approaches available to calculate 
a firm’s normal performance, they can be broadly grouped into two categories: statistical 
models and economic models. For the analysis one of the statistical models is used: the market 
model. For the use of statistical models, asset returns need to be jointly variate normal and 
independently and identically distributed through time. However, in practice the violation of 
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this normality assumption does not lead to problems because it is empirically reasonable and 
inferences using normal return models tend to be robust from deviations of the assumption 
(MacKinlay, 1997). For any security 𝑖 the market model is: 
 
𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑚𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
𝐸(𝜀𝑖𝑡 = 0)    𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝜀𝑖𝑡) = 𝜎𝜀𝑖
2  
 
Where 𝑅𝑖𝑡 and 𝑅𝑚𝑡 are the period-t returns on security 𝑖 and the market portfolio, respectively, 
and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is the zero-mean disturbance term. 𝛼𝑖, 𝛽𝑖 and 𝜎𝜀𝑖
2  are the parameters of the market model 
(MacKinlay, 1997). These parameters are estimated using the ordinary least squares based on 
an estimation period of [-200,-6] prior to the event, this is consistent with the estimation period 
used by other researchers, such as 225 days (Small at el., 2007), 150 days (Lummer and 
McConnel, 1989) and 239 days (Brown and Warner, 1985). Given the market model parameter 
estimates for each security in the sample, the even-related change or abnormal return can be 
calculated. Using the market model to measure normal returns, the sample abnormal return is 
equal to: 
 
𝐴𝑅𝑖?̂? =  𝑅𝑖𝜏 −  𝛼?̂? −  𝛽?̂?𝑅𝑚𝜏 
 
The abnormal return is the disturbance term of the market model calculated on an out of sample 
basis. In order to draw overall inferences for the event of interest I must aggregate the abnormal 
return observations of the individual firms over time. The cumulative abnormal return (CAR) 
for a single firm is given as: 
 
𝐶𝐴𝑅?̂?(𝜏1, 𝜏2) = ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑖?̂?
𝜏2
𝜏=𝜏1
 
 
Where 𝐶𝐴𝑅?̂?(𝜏1, 𝜏2) is the cumulative abnormal return for firm 𝑖 over the event period and 𝐴𝑅𝑖?̂? 
is the abnormal return of firm 𝑖 at time 𝑡. Test statistics for significance of the abnormal returns 
have been derived and tested for a sample of firms in several event studies [Masulis (1980), 
Holthausen (1981)]. In addition to the parametric statistics, event studies often report 
nonparametric tests as they do not require stringent assumptions about the return distributions. 
This paper will use the Wilcoxon signed-rank test as a nonparametric test, which compares the 
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proportion of negative and positive abnormal returns against an assumed 50 percent split under 
the null hypothesis of no reaction to the event (Cowan, 1992). There are several reasons to use 
nonparametric tests over parametric tests. First of all, if there is event related variance increase, 
standard parametric tests report, more often than expected, a price reaction when actually none 
exists. As the nonparametric tests do not use return variance they may perform better under 
variance increases than the parametric tests (Brown and Warner, 1985). Second of all, when the 
sample includes outliers the result of the parametric test could result from the outlier. Having 
an outlier leads to a special case of variance increase, and hence the nonparametric tests are 
also more accurate under these circumstances. Last of all, when the event window increases the 
use of the parametric test requires an adjustment to reflect autocorrelation in the time series of 
mean daily abnormal returns, while nonparametric tests do not require this correction.  
 
Because of these reasons and due to the distribution of the asset returns in the dataset used and 
the fact that they are far from normally distributed, the analysis will be based on the 
nonparametric Wilcoxon signed-rank test.   
 
5. Empirical results 
This part of the paper presents the empirical results for the hypotheses. The results are presented 
by the usage of tables alongside explanatory statistical tests. 
 
5.1 Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix 
5.1.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 shows the daily distribution of the return and the corresponding Score-variables as 
defined in section 4.1. It shows the number of observations, the mean, the standard deviation 
and the minimum and maximum of the respective variables during the event time. The mean 
for Score1 and Score2 are relatively similar with 62.39 and 61.56 respectively. Among the 
events the minimum equals 1.37 for Score1 and 3.41 for Score2. The maximum equals 88.49 
for Score1 and 90.34 for Score2. For the event study the change of the Scores 1 and 2 is needed, 
those are shown in the lower part of the table. The mean daily percentage change is -0.22% for 
Score1 and -0.19% for Score2, with a minimum of -1.51% and -1.79% respectively. The 
maximum positive daily change equals for Score1 7.14%, while for Score2 that is 4.39%. The 
dispersion of the change in the two scores is relatively similar around 1.05%.  
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Table 2  
Overall descriptive statistics 
This table presents the overall descriptive statistics for each score during the event day t=0. It shows the number of events for each score 
and the corresponding mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum for the equivalent score during a certain event. Data is collected 
from TruValue Labs. 
 Score1 Score2 
General score   
Mean 62.39 61.56 
Standard deviation 16.80 18.67 
Minimum 1.37 3.41 
Maximum 88.49 90.34 
Percentage change   
Mean -0.22 -0.19 
Standard deviation 1.05 1.04 
Minimum -1.51 -1.79 
Maximum 7.14 4.39 
Nb. of Obs. 725 542 
 
In order to identify a “significant change” in the dataset and hence to identify an event, a daily 
percentage change of more than three-standard deviations away from the mean daily percentage 
change of a Score of a single company is considered as an event. 
 
The summary statistics of the events for Score1 are shown on the left-hand side of table 3. In 
total there are 725 events, with 544 negative events and 181 positive events with an average 
score of 68.01 and 45.48 respectively. An average percentage change -0.70% for the negative 
events and an average of 1.28% for the positive events. The smallest positive change considered 
as a positive event is 0.08%, while the largest one equals 7.14%. Whereas, the largest negative 
drop that is classified as an event equals -1.51%.  
 
Concerning the summary statistics for Score2 the same approach is used and hence a three-
standard deviation change is considered as an event for Score2. The right-hand side of table 3 
shows the results of the events based on Score2. In total there are 542 events during the sample 
time window, with an average score of 68.09 for the negative events and 45.35 for the positive 
events. The average daily change is equal to -0.74% for the negative events and 1.18% for the 
positive events. The largest positive change equals 4.39% while the smallest positive change is 
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equal to 0.2%. For the negative events in Score2 the biggest score drop during the event is equal 
to -1.79% and the smallest drop is equal to -0.06%.  
 
Table 3 
Detailed descriptive statistics 
This table presents the detailed descriptive statistics for each type of event during the event day t=0. It shows the number of positive and 
negative events for each score and the corresponding mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum for the equivalent score during a 
certain event. Data is collected from TruValue Labs. 
 Score1 Score2 
 Positive events Negative events Positive events Negative events 
General score     
Mean 45.48 68.01 45.35 68.09 
Standard deviation 16.74 12.52 17.81 14.60 
Minimum 1.37 16.39 3.41 17.88 
Maximum 80.79 88.49 79.00 90.34 
Percentage change     
Mean 1.28 -0.72 1.18 -0.74 
Standard deviation 1.10 0.31 0.91 0.36 
Minimum 0.08 -1.51 0.20 -1.79 
Maximum 7.14 -0.16 4.39 -0.06 
Nb. of Obs. 181 544 156 386 
 
5.1.2 Correlation Matrix 
To determine the variables dependency at the same time, a spearman correlation matrix is 
performed (table 4). To assess whether there exists a significant relation between two variables 
in a population based on the sample (a period of 11-days [-5,5] around event date t=0), the 
following hypothesis is formulated: 
 
 Hypothesis 5(0): 𝜌𝑠 = 0 
 Hypothesis 5(A): 𝜌𝑠 ≠ 0 
 
In which 𝜌𝑠 is defined as the Spearman’s population coefficient. If H5(0) cannot be rejected 
there appears to be no monotonic relation between the two analyzed variables. 
 
- 22 - 
 
Table 4 
Spearman correlation matrix 
This table presents a Spearman correlation matrix between the daily abnormal return, the daily market return, the Fama and French SMB 
and HML and the ESG-scores 1 and 2, during the event window [-5,5]. A two-tailed t-test is performed in order to test on the significance 
of the correlation coefficients. ** and * indicate that Rho is significantly different from zero at the 1% and 5%, respectively. 
 AR Market Return SMB HML Score1 Score2 
AR 1      
Market Return -0.0059 1     
SMB 0.0567** 0.1898** 1    
HML 0.0237** 0.0211* -0.1766** 1   
Score1 0.0184* -0.0021 -0.0072 0.0063 1  
Score2 0.0173* 0.0004 -0.0154 0.0069 0.7414** 1 
 
The Spearman correlation matrix gives a first indication about the direction and significance 
between different variables. There appears to be a significant positive relation between the 
Fama and French size and value factor and the abnormal return, which is in accordance with 
their research (Fama and French, 1996). Additionally, both ESG-scores appear to have a 
significant positive correlation with abnormal return, indicating that a higher environmental 
overall score explains (part of) the abnormal return during the considered event window [-5,5]. 
Based on the nature of Score1 and Score2 it is not surprising that we find a significant positive 
correlation of 0.7414 between Score1 and Score2 
 
5.2 Inferential statistics 
5.2.1 Testing for normality 
When data is normally distributed it allows the use of parametric tests to determine statistical 
significance. However, more often than not this assumption is violated and hence testing for 
normality is of the essence. Testing for normality is done by looking at the distribution of 
(cumulative) average abnormal returns over the complete sample and subsamples. The tests are 
performed for the event date and the two event windows. Table 5 shows the results of a 
commonly used statistical test with a null hypothesis of normal distribution: the Shapiro-Wilk 
W test for normal data. Another commonly used practice is to look at the skewness and kurtosis 
of the data. 
 
The Shapiro-Wilk W test is a strong test (Royston, 1995) of departure from normality, first 
proposed by Shapiro and Wilk in 1965. The W can be interpreted as a measure of the 
straightness of the line in a probability plot, low p-values indicate a deviation of normality. The 
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skewness and kurtosis are used to see whether there occurs deviation from the values of a 
normal distribution (zero for the skewness and 3 for the kurtosis). 
 
The results in table 5 show, that for the complete sample and for the individual subsamples, 
there is significant deviation from a normal distribution. The Shapiro-Wilk test is significant at 
the 1% level for every (sub)sample. These results do not necessarily mean that all parametric 
tests are considered invalid, but it shows that next to the parametric tests, nonparametric tests 
are needed to confirm the results. 
 
Table 5 
Normal distribution test of full sample 
This table presents normal distribution tests for the different events and event windows of interest. *, **, and *** indicate significance 
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level. 
  Shapiro-Wilk 
(W) 
Skewness Kurtosis 
Full sample t=0 0.768*** -4.929 94.163 
[-1,1] 0.710*** 2.706 68.925 
[-1,3] 0.831*** 1.321 27.934 
Positive event score1 t=0 0.478*** -7.927 89.792 
[-1,1] 0.715*** -4.095 39.030 
[-1,3] 0.822*** -2.241 21.611 
Negative event score1 t=0 0.952*** -0.183 6.327 
[-1,1] 0.901*** 1.232 10.487 
[-1,3] 0.914*** 1.080 11.963 
Positive event score2 t=0 0.917*** 0.920 7.663 
[-1,1] 0.655*** 3.819 40.571 
[-1,3] 0.743*** 3.287 30.611 
Negative event score2 t=0 0.940*** -0.326 6.652 
[-1,1] 0.602*** 6.649 100.252 
[-1,3] 0.794*** 2.915 36.787 
 
5.2.2 Statistical results 
In order to test for hypothesis 1 and 2 the statistical significance of the abnormal returns is 
assessed by separating the positive and negative events of Score1 and Score2. Table 6 shows 
the results for the average abnormal return of the event date (AAR0) and the cumulative average 
abnormal returns (CAAR) of the periods [-1,1] and [-1,3]. The corresponding z-statistics (for 
the nonparametric test) and t-statistics (for the parametric test) of the variables are given in 
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column 2. Column 3 shows the portion of positive (cumulative) average abnormal returns 
against negative (cumulative) average abnormal returns. 
 
Table 6 
Average abnormal return and cumulative average abnormal return 
This table presents the average daily change in the firm’s market value around the date of a three standard deviation change in ESG-score estimated 
on a 195 day interval [-200,-6]. AAR[t=0] indicates the average abnormal return on the day of the event. CAAR[-1,1] gives the cumulative average 
abnormal return over a 3-day window. CAAR[-1,3] gives the cumulative average abnormal return over a 5-day window. Abnormal returns (AR) are 
given in percentages. Data is collected from TruValue Labs. T-values (Z-values) for mean (median) stock price reactions are from a one-sample t-
tests (Wilcoxon signed-rank test). *, **, and *** indicate that the mean (median) daily percentage change is significantly different at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% level. Note: the Wilcoxon signed-rank test tests whether the median is different from 0, while AR(%) is the mean abnormal return and hence 
there can occur a difference in sign. 
 Score1 Score2 
 Positive events Negative events Positive events Negative events 
 AR(%) (z-value) 
t-value 
Positive/ 
Negative 
AR(%) (z-value) 
t-value 
Positive/ 
Negative 
AR(%) (z-value) 
t-value 
Positive/ 
Negative 
AR(%) (z-value) 
t-value 
Positive/ 
Negative 
AAR 
[t=0] 
-0.237 (-.995) 
-1.240 
83/ 
98 
-0.089 (-1.822)* 
-1.669* 
255/ 
289 
0.097 (0.364) 
0.801 
79/ 
77 
-0.127 (-2.040)** 
-1.769* 
171/ 
215 
CAAR 
[-1,1] 
-0.190 (-0.342) 
-0.699 
87/ 
94 
0.085 (-0.512) 
0.881 
264/ 
280 
0.150 (-0.239) 
0.502 
74/ 
82 
-0.135 (-1.900)* 
-0.803 
179/ 
207 
CAAR 
[-1,3] 
-0.118 (-0.375) 
-0.367 
83/ 
98 
-0.013 (-0.935) 
-0.095 
255/ 
289 
0.044 (-0.917) 
0.128 
68/ 
88 
-0.190 (-1.951)* 
-1.040 
174/ 
212 
Nb. of 
Obs. 
 
181 
 
544 
 
156 
 
386 
 
To test hypothesis 1 and 2 the positive and negative events are separated by Score. For each 
subsample the null hypothesis is that the (cumulative) average abnormal return equals zero 
across the event period, if a significant deviation appears, the change in ESG-score had a 
discernible effect on the firm’s stock price. For Score1 the average abnormal return on the event 
date (t=0) is negative for both events, -0.237% for positive events and -0.089% for negative 
events. However, only the negative event appears to be statistically significant at the 10%-level. 
The cumulative average abnormal return in a 3-day (5-day) event window is -0.190% (-0.188%) 
for the positive event and 0.085% (-0.013%) during the negative event. This shows that the 
CAAR after a 3-day window is negative (positive) for a positive (negative) event. While for the 
5-day window both events have a negative cumulative abnormal return, however, not 
statistically significant. 
 
Events based on Score2 show slightly different results compared to events based on Score1. 
The average abnormal return on the event date (t=0) is a positive 0.097% for positive events 
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and a negative 0.127% during negative events. In which the negative event is statistically 
significant at the 10%-level when the parametric test is considered and at the 5%-level when 
the nonparametric test is considered. The cumulative average abnormal return in a 3-day (5-
day) event window is 0.150% (0.044%) for the positive event and -0.135% (-0.190%) during 
the negative event. This shows, in contrast to Score1 events, that the CAAR after a 3-day and 
5-day window is positive (negative) for a positive (negative) event. However, only the negative 
Score2 events appear to be statistically significant at the 10%-level when the nonparametric test 
is considered. 
 
The results show that on the one hand the magnitude of the impact is low for positive ESG 
Score1 events. So, H1(0) cannot be rejected, since the average change in a firm’s market value 
around a positive event date is barely significant. On the other hand, negative events appear to 
have a statistically significant negative reaction on the firm value after a negative change in the 
score. For Score1, this only appears during the event date itself (t=0) at the 10%-significance 
level. While, for Score2, this appears at the event date (t=0) at the 5%-significance level and 
for the 3-day and 5-day event window at the 10%-significance level. These results give strong 
support to H2(A) during the event date (t=0) and moderate support during the 3-day and 5-day 
event window. 
 
Table 7 
Average abnormal return and cumulative average abnormal return (high and low ESG-score) 
This table presents the average daily change in the firm’s market value around the date of a three standard deviation change in ESG-score estimated on a 195 day 
interval [-200,-6]. AAR[t=0] indicates the average abnormal return on the day of the event. CAAR[-1,1] gives the cumulative average abnormal return over a 3-day 
window. CAAR[-1,3] gives the cumulative average abnormal return over a 5-day window. Abnormal returns (AR) are given in percentages. Data is collected from 
TruValue Labs. Returns in bold show the higher return on a given event (in absolute terms). T-values (Z-values) for mean (median) stock price reactions are 
from a one-sample t-tests (Wilcoxon signed-rank test), or for the difference from a two-sample t-test (Mann-Whitney test). *, **, and *** indicate that the mean 
(median) daily percentage change is significantly different at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level. Note: the Wilcoxon signed-rank test tests whether the median is different 
from 0, while AR(%) is the mean abnormal return and hence there can occur a difference in sign. 
  Score1 Score2 
  Positive events Negative events Positive events Negative events 
 ESG- 
score 
AR(%) (z-value) 
p-value 
Positive/ 
Negative 
AR(%) (z-value) 
p-value 
Positive/ 
Negative 
AR(%) (z-value) 
p-value 
Positive/ 
Negative 
AR(%) (z-value) 
p-value 
Positive/ 
Negative 
AAR 
[t=0] 
Above 
average 
-0.385 (-0.849) 
-1.159 
44/ 
49 
-0.124 (-2.275)** 
-1.789* 
130/ 
168 
0.144 (1.309) 
1.044 
47/ 
33 
-0.092 (-1.569) 
-1.152 
105/ 
129 
Below 
average 
-0.080 (-0.528) 
-0.452 
39/ 
49 
-0.047 (-0.131) 
-0.563 
125/ 
121 
0.047 (-0.828) 
0.232 
32/ 
44 
-0.180 (-1.340) 
-1.341 
67/ 
86 
Difference 0.305 (0.136) 
0.811 
88/ 
93 
0.077 (1.521) 
0.716 
298/ 
246 
-0.098 (-1.408) 
-0.399 
76/ 
80 
-0.088 (-0.165) 
-0.564 
153/ 
234 
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CAAR 
[-1,1] 
Above 
average 
-0.290 (-0.167) 
-0.666 
43/ 
50 
0.071 (-0.674) 
0.583 
136/ 
159 
0.344 (0.691) 
1.338 
41/ 
39 
0.024 (-0.856) 
0.101 
114/ 
120 
Below 
average 
-0.085 (-0.312) 
-0.265 
44/ 
44 
0.101 (-0.044) 
0.659 
128/ 
121 
-0.054 (-1.035) 
-0.098 
33/ 
43 
-0.381 (-1.834)* 
-1.632 
65/ 
87 
Difference 0.205 (-0.148) 
0.379 
88/ 
93 
0.030 (0.341) 
0.153 
249/ 
295 
-0.399 (-1.237) 
-0.655 
76/ 
80 
-0.404 (-1.108) 
-1.225 
152/ 
234 
CAAR 
[-1,3] 
Above 
average 
-0.263 (0.012) 
-0.554 
46/ 
52 
-0.013 (-0.795) 
-0.080 
131/ 
160 
0.427 (0.552) 
1.285 
40/ 
42 
-0.109 (-1.336) 
-0.445 
105/ 
124 
Below 
average 
0.054 (-0.595) 
0.127 
37/ 
46 
-0.012 (-0.554) 
-0.057 
124/ 
129 
-0.379 (-1.818)* 
-0.601 
28/ 
46 
-0.308 (-1.436) 
-1.125 
69/ 
88 
Difference 0.316 (-0.473) 
0.499 
83/ 
98 
0.000 (0.068) 
0.001 
253/ 
291 
-0.806 (-1.821) 
-1.130 
74/ 
82 
-0.200 (-0.354) 
-0.545 
157/ 
229 
 
Testing hypothesis 3 is conducted in the same manner as described above (comparing the 
(cumulative) average abnormal return with zero). The nonparametric two-sample t-tests (Mann-
Whitney test) is used to test whether companies with a higher ESG-score react less to events 
compared to companies with a lower ESG-score. The results are presented in table 7. There are 
two cases in which the below average ESG-score companies earn a significantly negative 
cumulative abnormal return (at the 10%-level), while the above average ESG-score companies 
do not earn a significant abnormal return.  For the 5-day (3-day) event window the cumulative 
abnormal return of a positive (negative) event in Score2 is equal to -0.379% (-0.381%), 
however, the difference between the above and below average scores does not appear to be 
significantly different with a z-value of -1.821 (-1.108). There is one case in which the above 
average ESG-score companies earn a significantly negative abnormal return (at the 5%-level), 
while the below average ESG-score companies do not earn a significantly abnormal return. For 
the Score1 negative event date, the above average group earns a significantly negative abnormal 
return of -0.124%. However, the difference between the below and above average group does 
not appear to be significantly different (z-value equal to 1.521). 
 
Although the differences do not appear to be statistically significant, and hence we cannot reject 
H3(0), there is a pattern in absolute terms. For all the events based on Score2, companies with 
an above average ESG-score have a higher (cumulative) average abnormal return compared to 
companies with a below average ESG-score. To the contrary, if events are based on Score1, the 
companies with a below average ESG-score appear to generate a higher abnormal return (in 
absolute terms) then the companies with an above average ESG-score. 
 
6. Robustness 
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This part of the paper performs several robustness checks with regards to the event study. It 
alters some of the assumptions underlying the model. 
 
6.1 Alteration of event criteria 
For the base case scenario, a three-standard deviation increase is considered as an event, for 
this robustness check the threshold is lowered to a two-standard deviation change to see whether 
the results are robust. Table 8 shows the results for the average abnormal return of the event 
date (AAR0) and the cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR) of the periods [-1,1] and [-
1,3]. The corresponding z-statistics and t-statistics of the variables are given in column 2. 
Column 3 shows the portion of positive (cumulative) average abnormal returns against negative 
(cumulative) average abnormal returns. Interesting is that even though the threshold is 
decreased from three standard deviations to two standard deviations the number of events 
analyzed is less than for the three-standard deviation threshold. This is due to clustering 
concerns, which requires the removal of events that are overlapping in the estimation period. 
Therefore, the number of events available for the event study is less, even though in total more 
events occurred. 
 
Table 8 
Average abnormal return and cumulative average abnormal return (lower standard deviation) 
This table presents the average daily change in the firm’s market value around the date of a two standard deviation change in ESG-score estimated 
on a 195 day interval [-200,-6]. AAR[t=0] indicates the average abnormal return on the day of the event. CAAR[-1,1] gives the cumulative average 
abnormal return over a 3-day window. CAAR[-1,3] gives the cumulative average abnormal return over a 5-day window. Abnormal returns (AR) are 
given in percentages. Data is collected from TruValue Labs. T-values (Z-values) for mean (median) stock price reactions are from a one-sample t-
tests (Wilcoxon signed-rank test). *, **, and *** indicate that the mean (median) daily percentage change is significantly different at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% level. Note: the Wilcoxon signed-rank test tests whether the median is different from 0, while AR(%) is the mean abnormal return and hence 
there can occur a difference in sign. 
 Score1 Score2 
 Positive events Negative events Positive events Negative events 
 AR(%) (z-value) 
t-value 
Positive/ 
Negative 
AR(%) (z-value) 
t-value 
Positive/ 
Negative 
AR(%) (z-value) 
t-value 
Positive/ 
Negative 
AR(%) (z-value) 
t-value 
Positive/ 
Negative 
AAR 
[t=0] 
-0.470 (-0.092) 
-0.709 
25/ 
23 
-0.141 (-1.904)* 
-1.732* 
113/ 
151 
0.022 (0.099) 
0.211 
41/ 
44 
-0.143 (-1.798)* 
-1.778* 
118/ 
158 
CAAR 
[-1,1] 
-0.822 (-0.072) 
-0.967 
24/ 
24 
0.028 (-0.439) 
0.208 
119/ 
145 
0.029 (1.172) 
0.137 
49/ 
36 
-0.219 (-1.431) 
-1.421 
122/ 
154 
CAAR 
[-1,3] 
-0.858 (-0.062) 
-0.866 
24/ 
24 
0.145 (-0.400) 
0.742 
118/ 
146 
-0.135 (-0.716) 
-0.394 
36/ 
49 
-0.261 (-1.744)* 
-1.393 
127/ 
149 
Nb. of 
Obs. 
 
48 
 
264 
 
85 
 
276 
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The results presented in table 8 show, except for the 5-day event window of a positive event for 
Score2, the same sign as the base case scenario. Furthermore, the average abnormal returns on 
the event date for the negative events is still negative and statistically significant (at the 10%-
level). The only noticeable difference occurs for the negative Score2 event in the 3-day event 
window, where it turns insignificant once I use a two-standard deviation threshold instead of a 
three-standard deviation one. However, the cumulative average abnormal return for the event 
window is also negative. Hence, the results appear to be robust for a change in the threshold.   
 
6.2 Alteration of estimation window 
For the base case scenario, an estimation period of 195 days is used to predict the normal return 
of the stocks, for this robustness check we lower the estimation period to 100 days, in line with 
Cox and Peterson (1994). Table 9 shows the results for the average abnormal return of the event 
date (AAR0) and the cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR) of the periods [-1,1] and [-
1,3]. The corresponding z-statistics and t-statistics of the variables are given in column 2. 
Column 3 shows the portion of positive (cumulative) average abnormal returns against negative 
(cumulative) average abnormal returns. The total number of observations increases due to a 
smaller estimation period. 
 
Table 9 
Average abnormal return and cumulative average abnormal return (shorter estimation period) 
This table presents the average daily change in the firm’s market value around the date of a three standard deviation change in ESG-score estimated 
on a 100 day interval [-105,-6]. AAR[t=0] indicates the average abnormal return on the day of the event. CAAR[-1,1] gives the cumulative average 
abnormal return over a 3-day window. CAAR[-1,3] gives the cumulative average abnormal return over a 5-day window. Abnormal returns (AR) are 
given in percentages. Data is collected from TruValue Labs. T-values (Z-values) for mean (median) stock price reactions are from a one-sample t-tests 
(Wilcoxon signed-rank test). *, **, and *** indicate that the mean (median) daily percentage change is significantly different at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
level. Note: the Wilcoxon signed-rank test tests whether the median is different from 0, while AR(%) is the mean abnormal return and hence there can 
occur a difference in sign. 
 Score1 Score2 
 Positive events Negative events Positive events Negative events 
 AR(%) (z-value) 
t-value 
Positive/ 
Negative 
AR(%) (z-value) 
t-value 
Positive/ 
Negative 
AR(%) (z-value) 
t-value 
Positive/ 
Negative 
AR(%) (z-value) 
t-value 
Positive/ 
Negative 
AAR 
[t=0] 
0.102 (0.118) 
1.158 
154/ 
167 
-0.063 (-1.682)* 
-1.384 
416/ 
474 
-0.019 (-0.663) 
-0.224 
126/ 
131 
-0.170 (-2.909)*** 
-2.646*** 
279/ 
322 
CAAR 
[-1,1] 
0.039 (-0.346) 
0.241 
157/ 
164 
0.050 (-0.481) 
0.6241 
441/ 
447 
-0.096 (-0.806) 
-0.465 
123/ 
134 
-0.208 -(1.841)* 
-1.568 
285/ 
316 
CAAR 
[-1,3] 
0.205 (0.244) 
0.978 
155/ 
166 
0.028 (-0.786) 
0.264 
419/ 
468 
-0.347 (-2.401)** 
-1.409 
107/ 
150 
-0.264 (-1.614) 
-1.787* 
293/ 
308 
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Nb. of 
Obs. 
 
321 
 
890 
 
257 
 
601 
 
The results for the negative abnormal return on the event date itself are robust for the estimation 
window alteration. For Score1 the negative event yields an average abnormal return of -0.063%, 
significant at the 10%-level. Score2 yields an average abnormal return of -0.170% significant 
at the 1%-level. However, it appears in general that the results are not robust for an alteration 
of the estimation period. One of the reasons could be that if the event window is not sufficiently 
large there is a chance of spurious serial correlation for the estimated abnormal returns (it 
depends on the variance of the market). By extending the estimation window this source of bias 
will decrease and hence give more accurate predictions [Jonsson and Radeschnig, (2014), 
Erlien, (2011)]. Therefore, a longer estimation period is recommended. This could explain the 
differences in results observed. 
 
7. Discussion 
This part of the paper presents the results of the statistical analyses and will address the 
economic and academic implications, as well as the limitations of the study. 
 
7.1 Discussion of results 
The discussion starts with the individual analysis of the three hypotheses developed in section 
3 and tested in section 5. 
 
7.1.1 The linkage between ESG-rating and abnormal returns 
The event study was used to examine hypothesis one. The results showed a preponderance of 
negative cumulative average abnormal returns for all the event windows concerning a negative 
event in Score2 and two out of the three negative event windows for Score1. While the positive 
events have mixed results, negative (positive) cumulative abnormal returns for Score1 (Score2) 
for all event windows. These results contradict the overall literature review conclusion of Malik 
(2014), who indicates that there is a clear overweight of studies showing a clear positive firm 
value impact following positive CSR enhancing behavior. Even though my findings are not 
always statistically significant, they do not indicate that there is a clear positive relation and 
hence my results are more in line with Krüger (2014).  
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There are several possible reasons explaining the lack of a clear relationship between CSR and 
stock market performance. First of all, investors might not be able to assess the overall costs 
and benefits associated with the CSR initiatives, and investors might therefore be unable to 
completely understand or identify whether the CSR expenditures will meet profit criteria or not. 
If this is the case investors cannot reach a congruence view that will be reflected in stock price 
movements. This problem is especially extant in semi-efficient capital markets in which not all 
the costs and benefits associated with a project are communicated clearly. So, some investors 
judge the project as profitable while other investors judge it as unprofitable leaving no overall 
market reaction as a result. This could be a reasonable explanation due to the dataset used, as it 
is considered a startup and hence it is mainly used by individual investors, rather than market 
moving institutional investors, who lack the knowledge to successfully analyze all the costs and 
benefits associated with the projects. Second of all, it might not be a lacking ability of the 
investors to assess the economic gain of the project, but rather that there is no economic gain 
or loss associated with the ESG expenditure. There are two different perspectives that might 
explain this. Firstly, if markets are efficient then there is no consistent superior profit and no 
overall project acceptance will give a higher rate of return than the risk adjusted hurdle rate. 
This will lead all managers to accept the projects that meet this rate and reject all the projects 
that don’t. Leading to no value creation nor value destruction as a result, and hence investors 
do not care about ESG announcements. Secondly, if markets are not perfectly efficient and 
managers have imperfect information about the value of a project they might, besides the fact 
that they want to maximize shareholder value, unknowingly accept unprofitable projects. The 
payoffs of the profitable projects are than offset by the losses of the unprofitable projects. 
Another reason that leads to the same result is that managers sometimes accept projects based 
on “greenwashing”; they accept a project, but only in order to appear “green” and not because 
of economic payoffs. As a result, also here, the payoffs of the value creating projects are offset 
by the losses of the greenwashing projects. Overall, ESG related projects are no different than 
others and hence environmental initiatives are not unprofitable as long as the projects are 
assessed with the same profitability criteria as other projects. Third of all, the lack of a reaction 
in the long-run has to do with market efficiency, if markets are efficient there is no long-run 
abnormal return possible. Therefore, the abnormal return only prevails on the event date itself, 
when the new information becomes available, and disappears thereafter. However, this result 
is only visible for the negative events associated with Score1 and Score2, which would support 
the theory of Schepers (2006) that investors behave asymmetrical with regards to positive and 
negative information.  
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7.1.2 The difference between positive and negative events 
Furthermore, the asymmetrical argumentation from Schepers (2006) is in line with the results 
found for the second hypothesis, discussing the difference in reaction between positive and 
negative environmental changes. Prior literature [Krüger, (2014), Capelle-Blancard and Petit 
(2017), Klassen and McLaughlin (1996), Arnold et al. (2012)] also finds a negative reaction 
towards negative corporate social events, however, a clear positive link with positive events is 
not present. The event study conducted in this paper also only finds a significant negative 
relationship for harmful events and is unable to prove a positive one for ESG enhancing events.  
 
The first reason that explains this pattern is the concept of loss aversion and prospect theory. 
Which shows that if two choices are put before an individual, both equal, with one option 
presented in terms of losses and one option presented in terms of gains, the latter will be chosen. 
The paper of Soroka (2006) explains in great detail the effects of negative and positive 
economic news and the respective asymmetrical reaction. The results found in this paper are 
similar to Soroka who indicates that, firstly, there is simply more negative news than positive 
news; in this event study the number of significant negative events is higher than the number 
of significant positive events. This could be a reason that a significant effect occurs for negative 
ESG news, but a for positive ones it does not. It is more likely that investors come across 
negative news and hence also react negatively towards this news, while the positive news “slips 
through” and hence, there is an absence of a clear reaction. Secondly, the reaction towards 
negative news is much stronger than towards positive news; which can be explained by the 
cognitive biases described by Schepers (2006). This could be the first reason why the 
information with regards to ESG news is processed differently. The second reason that could 
explain the asymmetric reaction is that investors fear that the negative ESG news is a prospect 
for bad future economic performance and hence, investors sell their stocks, lowering the stock 
price and resulting in negative abnormal returns. However, investors do not believe that positive 
ESG news necessarily indicate positive future performance. This is also a result of cognitive 
biases and the loss aversive behavior of investors. A third reason that explains the difference in 
reaction is a result of the study conducted by Karpoff et al. (2005); who shows that losses 
associated with environmental violations are, on average, not larger than the legal penalties 
imposed on the violating firm rather than a result of reputational losses. The value of this penalty 
is immediately reflected in the stock price. However, there is no legal benefit when a company 
is doing good, only a legal penalty when companies are doing bad. The stock price reaction is 
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therefore not a result of a change in ESG, but rather a result of the legal costs associated with 
the legal penalty of the lower ESG-score.  
 
7.1.3 The linkage between above and below average ESG-rating and abnormal returns 
Besides the distinction of positive and negative ESG scores the third hypothesis divided the 
several subsamples into above and below average ESG scores to examine whether there was 
also an asymmetric relationship observed. Even though no statistically significant relationship 
appeared in any of the subsamples there was a pattern observable in which the below average 
group outperformed the above average group in real terms for Score1. To the contrary, for 
Score2 the opposite pattern appeared, where the above average group outperformed the below 
average group for every event window and every type of event.  
 
The reasons for outperformance of the above average ESG-score is based on the insurance-like 
features presented by Flammer (2013), Godfrey et al. (2009) and Bansal and Clelland (2004). 
For negative events, having a higher ESG score acts as an insurance against the current negative 
event. It shows investors that this is rather an anomaly than a pattern and hence shareholders 
react more reluctant towards the negative event. Godfrey (2005) follows a legalistic approach 
in their derivation and application of the relationship between a negative (ESG) event and the 
goodwill a firm received over the past. They argue that the punishment of investors towards 
firms that behave in an irresponsible way comes from the negative effects of the act itself and 
the state of mind and the intentions the offender has with the act. The punishment will be more 
severe when a bad act is committed by a bad actor. Meaning that CSR-based moral capital 
creates value if it helps to mitigate the impact of the negative event. Stakeholders attributing 
the harmful event to a managerial stumble rather than an intentional deed might temper their 
reactions accordingly and hence reduce the negative impact of the event. An event study 
performed by Godfrey (2009) indeed finds this insurance-like perception of investors and hence 
could explain the higher positive abnormal return observed for the above average ESG-score 
for Score2. This view is also in line with Bansal and Clelland (2004), who find that 
environmentally legitimate firms incur less unsystematic risk than illegitimate firms, and hence 
face a less heavy stock market reaction after negative news. In the case of Score2 the reaction 
towards positive events also leads to a higher abnormal return for the above average ESG-score. 
Baron (2009) shows that corporate social responsibility or moral management can be rewarded 
if citizens have altruistic preferences for the act of supporting social causes. A morally managed 
firm (a firm with a higher ESG-score) is able to charge a higher price and attracts a clientele of 
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consumers that are willing to pay a higher price for those products with higher CSP attributes. 
The market value of the morally managed firm also increases in the distribution of citizens’ 
social preferences for holding shares of the morally managed firm and hence increases the 
market value of those firms. Increasing the overall ESG-score, therefore, might attract new 
investors and hence increase the stock price especially if the increased level is above the 
threshold of socially responsible investors. 
 
However, a different pattern appears for the Score1 events in which the below average group 
statistically outperforms the above average group. This can be explained by the monotonic and 
concave benefits of CSR expenditure. Barnea and Rubin (2010), show that above a certain 
threshold there are no more benefits for investing in ESG. So, during positive events the 
marginal impact of the improved ESG-rating is higher for firms that have a below average rating 
than for firms that have an above average rating. Another reason that explains this pattern is 
that investors require a certain standard of ESG, but once that level is reached increasing ESG 
leads to a punishment of the market as those resources do not gain additional economic benefits 
for investors (Bird et al., 2007). For the negative events, having a lower score might temper 
investors’ expectations about ESG performance and hence they expect companies that have a 
higher rating to perform better, it is therefore that the punishment is less severe for the lower 
rated companies. This is contradicting to insurance-based view from Godfrey (2005), Flammer 
(2013) and Bansal and Clelland (2004) and is more in line with the results found in Baron 
(2009).  
 
Overall, there appears to be no clear economic explanation for why for Score1 the below 
average firms outperform and for Score2 the above average firms outperform for both positive 
and negative ESG-events. However, Baron (2009) also indicates that investors react differently 
under certain circumstances, which is an explanation why the results between the two scores 
differ. It might be a result of different circumstances unrelated to the ESG composition itself.  
 
7.2 Limitations 
There are some limitations that must be taken into consideration with regards to the event study 
methodology used in this paper. First of all, events might be anticipated in some situations, 
while unforeseen coexisting events could also impact the stocks in my sample, which in turn 
could lead to biased results. It might be the case that abnormal returns are a result of a coexisting 
event unrelated to changes in ESG-score. Second of all, variations in estimation and test periods 
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are commonly found, as also discussed in this paper. Determining the estimation and event 
period is a tradeoff between improved estimation accuracy and a potential shift in parameters. 
Furthermore, making use of long estimation periods makes it difficult to control for other 
confounding effects. That these differences can play a role in the results is clearly visible from 
the robustness checks performed. Third of all, the choice of model makes expected return 
estimation potentially affect the results and significance of abnormal returns. Moreover, the 
market index used to calculate the market-adjusted returns can show a difference in long-term 
performance results. This could result in incorrectly estimating expected returns and eventually 
lead to biased information in the results. Fourth of all, even though the analysis took clustering 
concerns into consideration, there might still be a chance that the event of one firm effects the 
estimation of another firm. Fifth of all, there might be a difference in variance between the 
estimation period and the event period. Moreover, the degree of dispersion may vary 
tremendously from one firm to the next. Failing to control for these varying degrees of 
dispersion across firms, generally leads to increased dispersion during the event date. Such 
varying firm effects lead to an increase in measured cross-sectional dispersion that actually 
reflects my failure to control for all relevant return influencing factors, and hence finding 
abnormal returns can be due to a change in variance rather than as a result of the event (Seiler, 
2000). Sixth of all, the uses of closing prices implicitly and incorrectly assume that they are 
equally spaced at 24-hour intervals. The influence of this nontrading effect on the variances and 
covariances of individual stocks and portfolios induces a bias for the market model (MacKinlay, 
1997). Another limitation of event studies is that the results are only reflected in additional 
value gains (or losses) for shareholders and other stakeholder utilities are not taken into 
consideration. There might be a shareholder welfare gain, but an overall welfare loss or vice 
versa. 
 
A lot of the limitations concerning the paper arise from the classified nature of the dataset itself, 
which makes it difficult to adjust for industry related factors or to implement control variables, 
it is also a rather new dataset and hence it only contains 1446 trading days which could be 
considered as rather small for event study analysis. Furthermore, because the way of analyzing 
news and the speed with which the information is processed and the fact that not many market 
movers (currently) implement the information provided by TruValue Labs, it is difficult to 
argue that the information is publicly available. This raises some doubts when the efficient 
market hypothesis is assumed to be true.   
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Further limitations arise based on the measure of ESG. Due to the composition of the data set 
its difficult to determine how the ESG-score is calculated exactly and hence the results of 
changing stock prices might be a result of the underlying factors rather than due to a change in 
corporate social responsibility. This could indicate that ESG is not the cause of improved 
economic performance, but rather the result. Orlitzky et al. (2003), gives an indication of this 
cohesion and shows that ESG is correlated to past financial performance. Also, Renneboog et 
al. (2008) argues that not necessarily ESG related strategies drive economic outperformance, 
but rather companies that outperform decide to invest in ESG related issues. Furthermore, it 
remains difficult to compare different ESG-based literature, due to the wide dispersion of 
methodologies used. Some implement event study methodology, others use investment 
strategies to analyze the impact of ESG or they relate ESG to improved accounting ratios like 
RAO, ROIC or ROE. All these different methodologies make it difficult to compare literature 
about corporate social responsibility.  
 
7.3 Suggestions for future research 
The limitations mentioned also open the door for further research that focusses on the daily 
ESG decisions and the different effects associated with it. This unique dataset that keeps track 
of daily ESG publications and news events could be used to analyze into greater detail the 
individual effects of environmental news, social news and news concerning governance. Even 
though the overall results presented in this paper show mainly a statistically negative reaction 
towards negative news and no statistically significant reaction towards overall positive news, 
individual components of ESG might find significant investor reactions. The reason that they 
do not appear in the results, could be a consequence of the fact that the positive and negative 
individual effects cancel each other out. Another area for future research with regards to the 
data is to implement several control variables like Fama’s and French’s three-factor model, 
industry adjustments or differences in market perception.  
 
Besides adding more variables to explain the short-term observations, more research should be 
conducted on the long-run financial performance of ESG investments. According to Porter and 
Kramer (2006) and Fatemi and Fooladi (2013) firms investing into ESG face lower financial 
performance, but gain the benefits due to long-term benefits associated with future cost 
reductions (Guedhami et al., 2016), improved customer, employee (Edmans et al., 2014) and 
investor loyalty (Gezcy et al. 2003), reputational gains and a reduction of losses associated with 
the agent-principal problem (Cremers and Nair, 2005).  
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Another implication of the dataset is to implement certain investment strategies based on 
(changes in) the respective ESG-score and assess economic and market performance based on 
generated alphas. Including also the smaller daily changes could lead to differences in results 
compared to the event-study analysis that only takes the bigger significant changes in ESG into 
account. The reason to link the scores to portfolio analysis also comes from the increased 
demand of investors to invest socially responsible and the non-financial utility retrieved from 
that (Mǎnescu, 2011).  
 
8. Conclusion 
This part of the paper will summarize the main findings and an assessment of the academic 
contributions. By making use of a unique daily updated database on ESG, I am able to analyze 
investor reactions after a change in the underlying ESG-score. Based on previous literature 
there was no clear expectation about the linkage between ESG and firm value. As certain studies 
and economic argumentations plead for a positive relation between ESG and firm value, while 
others find no clear relationship or even a negative one. Due to these uncertainties surrounding 
the relationship between corporate social performance and financial performance the paper 
keeps the option for every direction open to test for the first hypothesis. By performing an event 
study over different event windows it allows to test for a cumulative average abnormal return 
surrounding a certain event date. Results from the test show that in general there is no significant 
positive reaction after a positive event, for Score1 this reaction is even negative for the event 
date itself (-0.237%), a 3-day event window (-0.190%) and a 5-day event period (-0.118%). For 
Score2 on the other hand the results after a positive event are 0.097%, 0.150% and 0.044% for 
the event date, the 3-day window and 5-day window respectively. Showing contradicting 
results, however, not statistically significant and hence there can be no general conclusions 
drawn towards this relationship. On the other hand, negative events show a more distinct 
relationship, it shows that investors react significantly negative on the date of the news (-
0.089%) for Score1 and (-0.127%) for Score2. Because of this, I concluded that investors react 
asymmetrical towards positive and negative ESG news, which is also in line with results from 
Krüger (2014). 
 
Testing hypothesis 3, allowed for further analysis of the subsample. Dividing each event in a 
below and above average ESG-score allows for a more in-dept analysis of how different 
standards react to positive and negative events. The results show that, on general, there are no 
- 37 - 
 
significant difference between companies having an above average and below average ESG-
score. Which would indicate that the reaction towards the news appears to be similar for both 
standards.  
 
Overall, the results show that daily changes are perceived slightly different than the major 
corporate events. A significant positive relation to major improvements or announcements with 
regards to ESG found in most of the ESG literature stays out in this sample. However, 
researchers and academics can use this as a first step in trying to understand the effects of the 
daily ESG decisions that companies make instead of only analyzing major corporate events 
with regards to social responsibility. It also combines sophisticated artificial intelligence to the 
academic field of ESG, which could yield benefits not only in this particular subject, but also 
in different areas of academia. Furthermore, the dataset could be beneficial to investors to 
develop daily trading strategies based on corporate social requirements and how they can add 
value in portfolio management.   
 
There are still many aspects of ESG that are not completely understood, and hence more 
academic research is needed to clarify the exact relation between corporate social performance 
and financial performance (if one exists). And as a final remark, as is the case with all academia, 
the findings of this paper need to be taken with caution when applied to different topics 
regarding ESG. 
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